The Red Army: A New Role? by Thom, Françoise
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy Perspective
1991-02
The Red Army: A New Role?
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/3465
Boston University
PERSPECTIVE
Volume 1, No 3 (February 1991)
The Red Army: A New Role?
By FRANÇOISE THOM
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris
For a long time the army remained unaffected by the major conflicts disturbing the 
peoples of the USSR. Of course, it has always been implicitly present, since it is 
universally perceived as the potential barrier capable of halting and reversing the 
democratic and ethnic movements. However, recently there has been a change: The 
members of the military have become divided among various political tendencies and 
no longer hesitate to speak openly of their differing views.
There have been successive phases in the relations between the army and perestroika, 
each of which reflected to some extent the situation in the rest of society. The first phase 
was the seizure of control of the top military hierarchy by Gorbachev supporters. The 
old Brezhnevite cadres were purged under the cover of a discipline campaign aimed at 
correcting the most blatant abuses and appealing to the "heightened initiative" of the 
primary party committees. The worsening economic crisis then encouraged the view 
that a reduction in the size of the armed forces was necessary. A media offensive 
ensued against the Soviet "military-industrial complex," and these attacks continue 
despite a Central Committee resolution of April 29, 1989, calling for an end to the 
denigration campaign. In turn, these developments led the military to reconsider their 
role and their place in society.
The politization of the army began with an evocation of some of Yel'tsin's favorite 
themes: corruption among officers, bureaucracy, influence-peddling, lack of state 
welfare protection for junior officers, and the denunciation of inequalities, including the 
great number of generals with their dachas and other privileges. Several further factors 
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contributed to the political awakening of an army that had been seen formerly as a 
monolithic bloc.
The elections of March 1989 resulted in a degree of political differentiation among the 
army's representatives, since a small number of junior officers succeeded in winning 
seats against members of the top military hierarchy. The successive electoral 
campaigns powerfully contributed to giving circulation to ideas which had been 
considered heretical only a year earlier. The military candidates who emerged "from 
below" included in their programs calls for the professionalization or depolitization of the 
armed forces, while the candidates put forward by the apparatus limited themselves to 
the usual political clichés.(1)
The debate initiated in December 1989 on the abolition of Article 6 of the Soviet 
Constitution that ended in the abolition of the article in March 1990 aroused discussion 
of the functions of the political organs within the armed forces and, more generally, the 
question of the party's role with relation to the military in the Soviet Union. Beginning in 
mid-1989, it was possible to detect signs of a coming offensive against the political 
organs in the forces. In December 1989, General Lizichev spoke of a "regular offensive 
launched by destructive forces against the political organs of the army and navy."(2) 
Now, the question is being raised not only of the political organs—even the presence of 
the CPSU in the army is being contested.
The abolition of Article 6 put the political organs in a difficult position, since they were 
obliged to justify their existence now that the CPSU theoretically had abandoned its 
monopoly of power. Some officers attack the MPA indirectly, calling for the reactivation 
of the primary party cells in the army, which they claim have been crushed by the 
tyranny of the political organs. The MPA is accused of being an overblown hierarchy that 
interferes in everything and seeks to maintain its power by arrogating to itself the right to 
dispense benefits such as apartments and kindergarten places. Proposals have been 
made to make the low-level political organs elective, while abolishing the upper rungs of 
the hierarchy, i.e., the bodies at military region and army level.
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Other more radical officers, such as the well-known Lt. Col. Podziruk, openly attack the 
very institution of the MPA. Podziruk finds that the political organs fulfill no valid 
function. Instead, the political officers perform a useful function for the top command in 
enabling it to get rid of "dissidents," i.e., officers who support perestroika. Sentiment is 
now strong in the army for the complete elimination of party bodies from the army. 
During the 28th Party Congress, a poll of 560 officers showed that over 84 percent were 
in favor of the "departization" (now a normal term) of the army.
Among prominent political figures, Yel'tsin has proposed the abolition of the party cells 
in the army, as well as in the KGB and state administrative organs. During the 28th 
Congress, Gorbachev advocated the preservation of the party organs in the armed 
forces, while adding that other officially registered parties could also be represented. 
But if the severing of the link between the political organs and the party apparatus is 
accepted, it is clear that the result will be the disappearance of these bodies in the not 
too distant future.
Finally, a debate on fundamental military reform, particularly the future nature of the 
armed forces, has further polarized the army. Controversy centers on two basic issues: 
Should the USSR go over to a professional army? And should the country permit the 
principle of territorial units? On these questions also, the "democratic" reformist officers 
no longer hesitate to oppose the top military hierarchy, which is defending the traditional 
army system tooth and nail.
The creation of new institutions and organizations, such as the Defense and State 
Security Committee, has helped bring the military debate into the public arena. Of the 
committee's 38 members, seven are military officers, 19 are representatives of the 
military-industrial complex, while there are two KGB officials and five obkom secretaries. 
Reformist officers who showed a strong interest in serving were excluded, and such 
deputies complain that the committee is "remote-controlled from above."
3
The committee's purely "decorative" character has aroused deep dissatisfaction among 
deputies from the military determined to take their role seriously. When several 
committee members requested detailed information on the military budget for 1990, 
their application was rejected. Constitutionally, this situation is particularly revealing, 
since the committee is required to approve the military budget.
The Officers' Assemblies are another institution that has exacerbated emotions. These 
assemblies have been criticized for their lack of democracy, and are perceived as a 
"further instrument permitting the high command to oppress officers."(3) Most 
importantly, there are the "informal organizations," with which, according to a number of 
different sources and eyewitness accounts, the army is swarming. Even the Democratic 
Union, perhaps the most "revolutionary" of the opposition parties in the USSR, has 
recruited a number of militants among enlisted men and officers.(4)
The most famous of the military associations is Shield (Shchit), founded in March 1989. 
This organization with over 3,000 members has 10 deputies in the USSR Congress of 
People's Deputies and eight deputies in the RSFSR Congress. The honorary president 
is General Shaposhnikov, who was cashiered from the army and expelled from the party 
for refusing to fire on workers during the Novocherkassk uprising in 1962.
Col. Urazhtsev, co-president of Shield, cites the following among the goals of the 
organization: 1) ensure that the army is never used against the people; 2) create a 
servicemen's union; and 3) fight for the creation of an army of a new type appropriate 
for a law-based state. Urazhtsev has stated, "We glory in accusations of being anti-
Soviet, anti-Party, and anti-military, because we are convinced that the political system 
is soon going to collapse and hearing the moribund dinosaur vilify us gives us a feeling 
of pride and confidence in the future."
In recent months, there have been many indications that the political leadership has 
decided to put an end to this process of politicization of the armed forces. Moscow 
News reported in September, "All the democratic elements in the officer corps are being 
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systematically purged, sometimes under the pretext of reductions in the size of the 
armed forces."(5) A Central Committee resolution of December 20, 1989, ordered the 
discharge of any officer who joined Shield. Military Political Administration commanders 
have received a directive ordering them to try to prevent the formation of groups of 
Shield supporters in army units, and to conduct close surveillance of all officers with a 
view to determining candidates for discharge when personnel cuts are carried out.
It is still impossible to provide a precise political picture of the Soviet army, despite the 
new information available under glasnost.' In many cases, the military seems to be 
divided between a fundamental anti communism and an attachment to the power and 
cohesion of the state. In the final analysis, the political position of the military will 
depend on which of these two elements ultimately proves dominant, or alternatively on 
the combination of the two factors that emerges. Communism may end by being 
perceived either as what is ruining the state, or as what assures its integrity. However, it 
must be emphasized that the situation is still fluid and it is impossible to predict what the 
result of the politicization of the Soviet Armed Forces will be.
This article, commissioned for Perspective, draws in part on a paper under the 
same title published in French by the Centre de Sociologie de la Defense 
Nationale (series Annees Socialistes, No. 9, October 1990).
Notes:
1 To the 82 military deputies elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and 
the Supreme Soviet must now be added the 114 military deputies elected to the 
Supreme Soviet of the Union Republics. Of these, 42 were elected to the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet, where they have formed a conservative faction.
2 Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), December 8, 1989. 
3 Capt. S. Yastrebstev (Deputy, USSR Congress of People's Deputies), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, December 9, 1989. 
5
4 Moscow News, September 16, 1990. The case of Gen. Andreyev has also been 
referred to in the press. Andreyev was cashiered for having cnticized his superior 
officers, and his appeal was rejected by the Defense and State
Secunty Committe. See Literaturnaya Gazeta, September 26, 1990.
5 ibid
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